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KLEIN

EMANCIPATION UN-LOCKE’D: PARTUS SEQUITUR
VENTREM, SELF-OWNERSHIP, AND “NO MIDDLE STATE”
IN MARIA V. SURBAUGH
BY DIANE J. KLEIN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Maria v. Surbaugh,1 an 1824 Virginia case arising from a suit
for freedom by the children of an emancipated woman, is remarkable in
several ways - not least among them Judge John Williams Green’s open
repudiation of a Lockean theory of property in oneself that many regard
as foundational in Anglo-American law.2 The case also reveals important changes in the Virginia legal understanding of chattel slavery
over the first quarter of the nineteenth century, including its evolution
from an undoubtedly brutal and exploitative labor arrangement into a
sui generis institution inextricably linking heritable enslavement to African descent itself.3 Attempts to emancipate human chattel property
(and their unborn issue) upon an age condition greater than twenty-one
years also raised vexed future interests problems with which these nineteenth-century slaveholding jurists were forced to deal.4
To give away the ending, the children’s suit failed.5 While their
mother was a little girl, her enslavement had been made terminable
when she reached 31 years of age.6 But her children Maria, Nancy, Solomon, and Samuel were all born before that happened, and did not benefit from that limitation on her enslavement.7 After three decades in

©2020 Diane J. Klein
*
Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law, Ontario, California. This Article is
dedicated to the two women who inspired it, and whose work has “bookended” my scholarship
in this area: Prof. Adrienne Davis, whose The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999), has shaped my teaching of wills and trusts for twenty
years; and Prof. Stephanie Jones-Rogers, whose book, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY (Yale University Press: 2019), rekindled my sense of urgency around exploring the connections between
the American history of slavery, gender, maternity, and archaic property rules.
1
23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824).
2
See id. at 228, 231.
3
See id. at 236–37.
4
See id. at 239–40.
5
Id. at 245.
6
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228–29 (1824).
7
Id. at 228, 245.
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bondage, Mary was absolutely free - but her four children were enslaved
for life.8
The case might seem like a straightforward application of the
principle (codified repeatedly in Virginia law from the 17th century onward9) that under slavery, the condition of the children follows that of
the mother - but the Virginia Supreme Court10 saw it as anything but
simple. Paradoxically, what Judge Green’s genuinely painstaking and
scholarly analysis demonstrates most clearly is that a path, and a precedent,11 favoring the children’s liberty and personhood was available,
both legally and intellectually. But he rejected it.12 When given the
chance to choose between a humane and decent outcome, and one that
more thoroughly maintained and perpetuated slavery, the Court chose
the latter.13
Judge Green presents himself as legally compelled to this result,
his duty being “to ascertain and pronounce what the law is,”14 and “to
execute the law as I find it,”15 conceding only, in the words of Ulpian,
“Quod quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est” (“This indeed
is exceedingly hard, but so the law is written”). The high court of another slave state, Tennessee, said of Judge Green’s reasoning, “It is a
most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in prejudice of human
liberty, and is in conflict with the opinions of Chancellor Wythe and
Judge Roane, in the cause of Pleasants v. Pleasants.”16 In that case, on
similar facts, Judge Spencer Roane had declared, “I rejoice to be an
humble organ of the law in decreeing liberty to the numerous appellees
now before the court.”17

8

Id. at 228–29, 245.
2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 170 (William Waller Hening ed., New York,
NY, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 2 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES]. By contrast,
for example, Maryland passed a law in 1664 enslaving not only the children of enslaved fathers
and freeborn mothers, but the mothers as well. JENNIFER L. MORGAN, LABORING WOMEN:
REPRODUCTION AND GENDER IN NEW WORLD SLAVERY 72 (2004).
10
At all times relevant here, Virginia’s highest court was called the “Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia,” its justices were simply referred to as “Judge” and the Chief Justice as “President.”
In what follows, I will generally refer to it as the “Supreme Court” or the “Supreme Court of
Virginia,” to avoid confusion. A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, VA. APPELLATE
CT. HIST., https://scvahistory.org/scv/supreme-court-of-virginia/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020).
11
See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319 (1800).
12
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228–29.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 229.
15
Id. at 244–45.
16
Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 227, 242 (1834).
17
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 344 (1800).
9
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Judge Roane, like Judge Green,18 was a slaveowner himself.19
He was nevertheless persuaded by the arguments of his future judicial
opponent and Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, then-lawyer
John Marshall, to free the unborn children of a conditionally emancipated enslaved woman.20 Similar arguments were unavailing with
Judge Green and his brethren in 1824.21 In the tortured reasoning of
Maria v. Surbaugh we witness a crucial step toward the pernicious legal
binarism that claims “no middle state between slavery and absolute freedom,”22 paralleling the racist “one-drop” ideology applied to persons of
African descent,23 each no less influential for being fictive.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Human chattel slavery - permanent, racialized, and hereditary is in a sense impossible in the fixed and rigid taxonomy of Anglo-American private property law. As Blackstone says, “The objects of dominion or property are things, as contradistinguished from persons.”24 Persons (natural or non-natural) are, each of them, potential property
owners; everything else is potential property, to be owned by persons.25
The idea of human beings as property at all is therefore deeply problematic, a category mistake; like enslavement itself, the individual transition
from slavery to freedom, individual emancipation without abolition,
was literally inconceivable under traditional property theory and law.26
And yet, it occurred - an event whose very comprehensibility revealed
the monstrous fiction at the heart of human enslavement.

18
John W. Green, Wikipedia.com, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Green (last visited
Feb. 10, 2020).
19
Judge Spencer Roane, ROANE FAMILY TREE, http://roanefamilytree.com/Judge_Spencer_Roane.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
20
Id.; Pleasants, 6 Va. at 330.
21
See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 241–42 (1824).
22
Id. at 240.
23
See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule,
1600-1860, 91 MINN. L. REV. 592, 593 (2007).
24
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *16, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch14.asp.
25
See Property and Ownership, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/property/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2020).
26
See James L. Huston, Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War, 65 J. OF
SOUTHERN HIST. 249, 262 (1999).
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The judges who decided Maria v. Surbaugh thus were operating
within a complex, internally contradictory legal framework that had developed over two centuries of slavery in Virginia.27 The law of slavery
was not static, and varied from colony to colony (later, from State to
State). By the 1820s, Virginia slave law contained a variety of statutes
and doctrines relevant to the question presented by Maria v. Surbaugh,
the status of the afterborn issue of a conditionally emancipated enslaved
woman, though no facts quite like it had come before the Virginia Supreme Court before 1824.28
A. Testamentary manumission
1. Outright
Freeing enslaved persons by will, also known as testamentary
manumission, was not unknown in the earliest period in Virginia.29
However, by an Act of 1723 (reenacted in 1748),30 such private emancipations were prohibited.31 “The law of 1723 forbade the freeing of
any slave, on any pretense, ‘except for some meritorious service,’ as
judged by the governor and Council. No longer could an owner manumit
a slave privately . . .”32 As a result, “[b]etween 1723 and the American
Revolution only about twenty-four enslaved people were legally emancipated in Virginia.”33 Twenty-four – out of an enslaved population
numbering in the hundreds of thousands.34
27

Philip D. Morgan, Virginia Slavery in Atlantic Context, 1550 to 1650, in VIRGINIA 1619:
85, 85 (Paul Musselwhite, et al.
eds., 2019).
28
See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824).
29
Linda Rowe, After 1723, Manumission Takes Careful Planning and Plenty of Savvy,
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUND., https://www.history.org/history/teaching/enewsletter/volume3/february05/manumission.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
30
Catherine Wisnosky, The Will of the Master: Testamentary Manumission in Virginia, 18001858 (Aug. 1, 2015) (unpublished M.S. dissertation, University of Nevada, Las Vegas) (on file
with Digital Scholarship at UNLV Theses and Dissertations Database).
31
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 324 (1800).
32
Adele Hast, The Legal Status of the Negro in Virginia 1705-1765, 54 J. OF NEGRO HIST. 217,
221 (1969). Deed of Manumission for Francis Drake, May 23, 1791, EDUC. AT LIBR. OF
VIRGINIA, https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/drake
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
33
Deed of Manumission for Francis Drake, May 23, 1791, EDUC. AT LIBR. OF VIRGINIA,
https://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/drake (last visited
Mar. 26, 2020).
34
See Statistics on Slavery, WEBER ST. U., https://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statistics_on_slavery.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2020). In 1750, the Black population of Virginia was
101,452; by 1790, the enslaved Black population had grown to 292,627. Id.
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF ENGLISH AMERICA
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This law changed after Independence. In 1782, Virginia passed
“An act to authorize the manumission of slaves,” providing, in pertinent
part
. . . that it shall hereafter be lawful for any person, by his or her
last will and testament, or by any other instrument in writing, under his
or her hand and seal, attested and proved in the county court by two
witnesses, or acknowledged by the party in the court of the county where
he or she resides, to emancipate and set free, his or her slaves, or any of
them, who shall thereupon be entirely and fully discharged from the performance of any contract entered into during servitude, and enjoy as full
freedom as if they had been particularly named and freed by this act.35
This 1782 law also required that persons emancipating enslaved
minors or persons over 45 years old make provision for their support.36
A formerly enslaved person over 45 was both rare and “old”; life expectancy for enslaved women ranged from 18 to 38,37 and for enslaved people overall, about 40,38 although some evidence suggests there were
more enslaved centenarians than White ones.39
Some of the “Founding Fathers” took advantage of this restored
opportunity. For example, Thomas Jefferson freed five enslaved men
by his will, Joseph Fossett, Burwell Colbert, and John, Madison, and
Eston Hemmings, the last and youngest of whom was 18 at the death of
Jefferson (their probable father) on July 4, 1826.40
2. Emancipation in futuro: postponed and conditional
manumission
But not all manumissions, even testamentary ones, took effect
immediately. For example, George Washington’s 1799 will freed the
35

11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE
1619, at 39–40 (William Waller Hening ed.,
Richmond, Va. George Cochran, 1823). [hereinafter 11 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES).
36
Id.
37
What was Life Like Under Slavery, DIGITAL HIST. (2019), http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=3040; Life Expectancy and Mortality Rates,
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/applied-and-social-sciencesmagazines/life-expectancy-and-mortality-rates (last updated Mar. 17, 2020); see also Maris A.
Vinovskis, The Demography of the Slave Population in Antebellum America, 5 J. of Disciplinary
Hist. 459, 463–64 (1975).
38
Slave Health on Plantations in the United States, WIKIPEDIA.COM, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slave_health_on_plantations_in_the_United_States (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
39
See Health History: Health and Longevity Since the Mid-19th Century, STANFORD SCH. OF
MED., https://geriatrics.stanford.edu/ethnomed/african_american/fund/health_history/longevity.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
40
Slaves Who Gained Freedom, THE JEFFERSON MONTICELLO, https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/slaves-who-gained-freedom (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
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123 persons enslaved at Mount Vernon who belonged to him (of the
total of 317) - but not until the death of his wife, Martha.41 Martha also
had a life interest in 153 “dower slaves” she received as the widow of
Daniel Parke Custis, who would go back to the Custis family upon her
death.42
Postponed manumissions were inherently conditional. Whether
emancipation depended upon the enslaved person’s attainment of a particular age, or upon outliving another person (like a widow), it could
never be known in advance whether the enslaved person would live long
enough to reach freedom. Perhaps to avoid conflicts with the support
provisions of the 1782 law, testamentary manumissions, especially of
minors, often did not take effect until the enslaved persons reached specified ages.43 Further complicating matters, some persons “emancipated
in futuro”44 were or grew into fertile women of childbearing age, who
gave birth to children while still enslaved themselves on unfulfilled
emancipation conditions.45
Such was the situation of little Mary, born in 1787 and bequeathed in 1790, upon the condition that she be emancipated only
many years later.46 And such were the circumstances under which
Mary’s children, Maria, Nancy, Solomon, and Samuel, the plaintiffs in
Maria v. Surbaugh, came into the world.47
B. Partus sequitur ventrem and the doctrine of increase: one rule or
two?
In 1662, long before Mary’s own birth, Virginia had enacted a
statute under the heading, “Negro womens [sic] children to serve according to the condition of the mother,” providing that,

41

A Decision to Free His Slaves, George WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/slavery/washingtons-1799-will (last visited
Mar. 26, 2020). In fact, she emancipated them by deed in 1801, perhaps because she did not
need their labor, and perhaps for fear of her own safety. Id. Another 41 enslaved persons were
rented from a neighbor and daughter-in-law of Martha’s. Id. She died in 1802. The Deaths of
George
&
Martha,
GEORGE
WASHINGTON’S
MOUNT
VERNON,
https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/martha-washington/the-deaths-of-georgemartha/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
42
A Decision to Free His Slaves, supra note 41.
43
See id. at 27.
44
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 244 (1824).
45
Id. at 228.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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Whereas some doubts have arisen whether children got by any
Englishman upon a negro woman should be slaves or free, Be it therefore enacted and declared by this present grand assembly, that all children borne in this country [shall be] held bond or free only according to
the condition of the mother . . .48
This rule, “contradicting the rule of the common law”49 which
conferred status based on paternity, was carried forward by subsequent
statutes, last enacted in 1753, and still in effect at the time of Maria v.
Surbaugh.50 This Virginia rule is reminiscent of another older and more
general rule of property law as it applies to animals, known as the “doctrine (or rule) of increase.”51 This ancient and near-universal rule52 assigns ownership of newborn animals to the person who owns the mother
(“newborn animals belong to the person who owns the newborn’s
mother”53).54 This rule was already well-enough established in English
common law by the Tudor period that it was notable when an exception
was made to it, in a 1592 case about the disputed ownership of cygnets
(baby swans),55 memorable also for the colorful commentary provided
by Lord Coke in the early 1600s.56
Confusingly, the Latin maxim partus sequitur ventrem, literally,
“the issue follow the womb,” was historically used to express the doctrine of increase, a rule about animal ownership.57 In England, the
maxim endured as a part of game law.58 But in slave-owning Virginia,
48

2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE

FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 170 (William Waller Hening ed., Rich-

mond, VA, Samuel Pleasants, 1810). “Negro womens children to serve according to the condition of the mother,” imperfectly quoted at Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 237 (omitting the word
“only”).
49
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 237.
50
Id. at 231.
51
See Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So.2d 852, 855 (Miss. 1963).
52
See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 368 (1954)
(explaining that the particular rule that the owner of a mare owns the offspring “has appealed to
many different societies across hundreds of generations”).
53
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership. 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 460
(2009).
54
Id.
55
See The Case of Swans, 77 Eng. Rep. 435 (K.B. 1592).
56
4 THE REPORTS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, KNT.: IN THIRTEEN PARTS, at 85 (John Henry Thomas
ed., John Farquhar Fraser ed., J. Butterworth and Son 1826) (“[T]his case of the swan doth differ
from the case of kine, [archaic plural of “cow”] or other brute beasts”).
57
See, e.g., EDWARD CHRISTIAN, A TREATISE ON THE GAME LAWS 27, 29 (1817) (discussing the
seventh book of Lord Coke’s Report, which explains that “the general law; which is, that ‘partus
sequitur ventrem,’ or the whole of the young or offspring belong to the owner of the mother or
female”).
58
See id. at 24.
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this maxim expressing a property rule (who among contending claimants was the owner of an animal’s offspring) was repurposed to answer
a much more foundational status question: whether certain human beings were property at all.59
Although he concurs in the outcome of Maria v. Surbaugh,
Judge Francis T. Brooke60 alone among the panel recognizes and rejects
this equivocation, and distinguishes partus sequitur ventrem from the
rule that “all children shall be bond or free, according to the condition
of their mothers.”61 He does so without citation, but historically at least,
Judge Brooke is correct that the doctrine of increase “is a rule of property, not of liberty,”62 and the rule looking to the condition of the mother
to determine enslaved status “is a rule of a different character.”63
Yet Virginia law combines these two ideas, blurring this distinction between status of the mother and ownership of the offspring, as dual
aspects of her “condition,” lending a patina of age and legitimacy to a
particularly inhuman aspect of the emerging Virginia law of chattel
slavery (a word aptly sharing its etymological origins with “cattle”64):
the treatment of the enslaved as human livestock, rather than (at worst)
persons bound in a contractual and terminable relation of servitude.65
Partus sequitur ventrem as it was understood in Virginia slave
law thus meant that:
(1) The issue of an enslaved woman born during her enslavement are enslaved, and are the property of the person who owns their
mother; and
(2) The issue of an emancipated (or freeborn) woman (born after
her emancipation) are free, and are no one’s property66 (although, if a
certain 1705 act applies, they may be bound to service67).
C. The offspring of an enslaved woman temporarily rented to another
Enslaved persons, perhaps even more frequently than livestock,
were sometimes rented out.68 Renting out a pregnant enslaved woman
59

See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 245–46 (1824) (Brooke, J., concurring).
A Short History of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 10.
61
Maria. 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245–46 (Brooke, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 246 (Brooke, J., concurring).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 231–32; Chattel, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
65
See Hast, supra note 32, at 218.
66
See supra Part II.B.
67
Hast, supra note 32, at 219–20.
68
See, e.g., JOHN J. ZABORNEY, SLAVES FOR HIRE: RENTING ENSLAVED LABORERS IN ANTEBELLUM
VIRGINIA 28 (2012); see, e.g., 3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS
60
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until after her child was born was a familiar device to reduce expenses
at a time of her diminished labor capacity.69 As John Zaborney explains
in Slaves for Hire: Renting Enslaved Laborers in Antebellum Virginia,
Hiring out slave women was a very common practice among
Virginia slave owners, and far from being an obstacle to the hiring out
of female slaves, pregnancy increased a female slave’s likelihood of being hired out by whites who sought to get the relatively unproductive,
and relatively costly, slaves off their hands….[T]he hiring out of pregnant slave women. . .was an inherent and routine feature of slave hiring,
and slavery generally, in Virginia.70
The ownership of children born during that time was not disputed.71 Just as a calf born to a cow on loan to a neighboring farmer
ultimately belonged to the lender, not the borrower (who had their use
only temporarily), so, too, children born to an enslaved woman ultimately belonged not to the person to whom she had been temporarily
hired out (for example, to perform domestic labor), but rather, to her
owner.72
The law of Virginia was clear on this point:
[T]here is now no question in Virginia, but that in relation to slaves, the increase born during the continuance
of any temporary interest in the mother goes, as she does,
to the person entitled to the absolute property in the
mother, after the expiration of the temporary interest, unless otherwise directed by the original owner of the female.73
These notions of “temporary” and “absolute” interest applied to
any present and future interest, not just a short-term hire, but also a life
estate and remainder, and applied regardless of whether the future interest was reversionary, as the right of the original hirer, or in a third
party.74 Citing cases going back a hundred years, the Court reiterates
OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at

447–63 (William Waller Hening ed., Philadelphia, PA, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 3 HENING’S
VIRGINIA STATUTES]; see also Hast, supra note 21, at 234–35 (explaining how slaveholders often hired out women and girls to other slaveholders).
69
ZABORNEY, supra note 68, at 29.
70
Id. at 30.
71
See CHRISTIAN, supra note 57, at 29; Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 246 (1824)
(Brooke, J., concurring).
72
See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 230.
73
Id.
74
See id.
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that “the increase goes to the person entitled to the original stock, after
the life-estate expired. And this rule has become common law to us.”75
And so we have:
Lemma to (1): The issue of an enslaved woman born during her
enslavement subject to a present interest are enslaved, and are the property of the person who owns the future interest in their mother.76
This is a default rule; it would also be possible to transfer the
offspring to the present interest holder, or a third party, just as one might
transfer present and future interests in other forms of property to different transferees.77
D. The mixed-race offspring of a White woman
Under Virginia’s partus sequitur ventrem law, the children of
enslaved women were enslaved, whatever their paternity.78 But what
about the reverse - mixed-race children of White mothers? By a law of
1705, by “An act concerning Servants and Slaves,” miscegenation was
expressly prohibited,79 rendering sexual activity between White women
and non-White men itself illegal.80 But it nevertheless occurred, frequently enough that the law was called on to address the status of any
resulting children. They were not enslaved, but rather, were bound to
service for thirty one years.81 Shockingly, perhaps, this law did not apply only to White mothers who were themselves servants, although such
women might also see their own indenture extended to provide for the
child.82 Nor did it apply only to children whose fathers were enslaved
or in service.83 This law applied even if both parents were free people.84
As African descent came to be more and more closely identified
with enslaved status per se in Virginia, mixed-race persons were at risk
of permanent enslavement.85 And thus, in 1765, the Virginia Assembly
75

Id.
See id.
77
See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 230.
78
See 2 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 9, at 170.
79
3 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 447–63.
80
Id. at 454.
81
Id. at 452–53.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
See 3 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 452–53.
85
See Hast, supra note 32, at 234 (“An individual with any Negro ancestry had to be able to
claim only one Negro and fifteen white great great grandparents to achieve the rights and status
of a Caucasian”); see also ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE AND ARIELA GROSS, BECOMING FREE,
BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREEDOM, AND LAW IN CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA (2020).
76
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passed “An act to prevent the practice of selling persons as slaves that
are not so, and for other purposes therein mentioned.”86 As its name
suggests, the Act was primarily directed against “divers ill disposed persons [who] have of late years been guilty of selling and disposing of
mulattoes and others as slaves, who by the laws of this colony are subject to a service only of thirty one years, after which they become free.”87
The Act made this conduct, when done knowingly, subject to a heavy
fine.88
The second important provision of this law was to cut back the
thirty-one year age condition to twenty-one for men, and eighteen for
women - in other words, to something like an age of majority or adulthood.89 The longer time of service was deemed “an unreasonable severity towards such children,”90 who were of course not responsible for the
circumstances of their birth.
E. The leading case: Pleasants v. Pleasants
In 1771, Quaker John Pleasants (born in 1697) made a will bequeathing his estate, including more than 400 enslaved persons, to numerous relatives.91 The will stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
My further desire is respecting my poor slaves all of them as I
shall die possessed with, shall be free, if they chuse it, when they arrive
to 30 years of age, and the laws of the land will admit them to be free,
without their being transported out of the country, I say all my slaves
now born, or hereafter to be born, whilst their mothers are in the service
of me or my heirs, to be free at the age of 30 years, as above mentioned
. . .92
When he was writing, Pleasants knew full well that “the laws of
the land” did not permit private emancipation (without forced exile).93
But he hoped the law would change - and in 1782, it did.94 Robert,
86

8

THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF

VIRGINIA, FROM THE
1619, at 133–35 (William Waller Hening ed.,
New York, NY, R. & W. & G. Bartow, 1823) [hereinafter 8 HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES].
87
Id. at 133.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319–21, 334 (1800).
92
Id. at 334.
93
Id. at 324; see FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 85, at 88–89.
94
WILLIAM WALLER HENING, 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE
LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, 39-40
(Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821).
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR
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John’s abolitionist son95 and the executor of his father’s estate, sought
to emancipate as many enslaved persons as his father’s will and the laws
of Virginia would allow, over the objection of what appears to be most
of the rest of his family.96 Robert’s efforts led to the largest testamentary
manumission case in American history,97 requiring the Virginia Supreme Court to determine to what extent this complex devise should be
given effect.98
Pleasants v. Pleasants was a big case in every way.99 It was
argued and decided by some of Virginia’s leading legal lights, and it
concerned the estate of one of the largest slaveholders in Virginia or any
Colony (440-500 enslaved persons, depending on the source).100 In
Chancery, ably represented by the future Chief Justice of the United
States, John Marshall, Robert prevailed; but before the Virginia Supreme Court, he (and the enslaved persons he represented) fared considerably less well.101 The resulting opinion, Pleasants v. Pleasants, became Virginia’s leading case on multigenerational, postponed, and
conditional testamentary manumission.102 The situation was complex,
and all of the parties, as well as the judges, recognized that different
enslaved persons, of different ages and situations, might require different treatment.103 But the judges did not agree on how or what should be
done, and their opinions reveal deep divisions amongst jurists of the
time.104
1. Judge Spencer Roane votes to emancipate. . .
Judge Spencer Roane (1762-1822), decades younger than the
other two judges who heard the case, was not yet forty and on the bench
for just five years when Pleasants came before the court.105 Following
95
William Fernandez Hardin, Robert Pleasants (1723-1801), ENCYCLOPEDIA VIRGINIA,
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Pleasants_Robert_1723-1801 (last updated June 11,
2019).
96
See id.
97
Id.
98
See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 319 (1800).
99
Hardin, supra note 95.
100
See Tom Blake, The Sixteen Largest American Slaveholders from 1860 Slaves Census
Schedules, ROOTSWEB, https://sites.rootsweb.com/~ajac/biggest16.htm (last updated Dec.
2004).
101
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 330, 333.
102
See Hardin, supra note 95.
103
See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 353–54.
104
Id. at 343–44, 346.
105
See Spencer Roane, WYTHEPEDIA W & M L. LIBR., https://lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Spencer_Roane (last updated Sept. 10, 2018).
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his law teacher Chancellor Wythe in the lower court,106 Judge Roane
took the most emancipatory approach.
He began with an analysis that assumes it is entirely unproblematic to treat persons suing for their own freedom as claiming a property
right in themselves.107 As he puts it, “I will also consider, in the first
place, the claim of the appellees to their freedom, only, as that of ordinary remaindermen, claiming property in them . . .”108 under “the rules
of the common law, relative to ordinary cases of limitations [future interests] of personal chattles.”109 The Rule Against Perpetuities, in the
form familiar to us today (with slightly less terminological precision),
applies to such property,110 with the same results: “. . . where the event
must happen, if at all, within those limits [the perpetuities period], the
executory devise is good; and on the happening of the contingency, the
estate will become absolute, in the remainderman.”111 At the same time,
Judge Roane acknowledges that “. . . neither the particular species of
property now in question, nor the case of a remainderman (if I may so
express it) claiming his own liberty, were in the contemplation of the
judges, who established the doctrine on this subject [the Rule Against
Perpetuities] . . .”112
That the litigants are seeking their own freedom, for him, only
strengthens the case: “if their claim will be sustained on this foundation,
and by analogy to ordinary remainders of chattles, every argument will
hold, with increased force, when the case is considered in its true point
of view, as one, which involves human liberty.”113 Judge Roane puts
these persons, who have been objects of property but now claim freedom, on the same footing as those who might have claimed an ordinary

106

See id.; Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 343–45 (1800).
See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 335.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 335–36. Whether enslaved persons are to be treated as real property, personal property
(“chattels” or “chattles,” the judges themselves utilize different spellings), or some hybrid, is
not squarely at issue in this case. See id. at 332, 335–36, 339, 347; but see 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE n. E (1803). Under the laws of Virginia, enslaved persons were classified as real property in 1705, but re-classified as chattles in
1727, including for future interests purposes. See Warren M. Billings, The Law of Servants and
Slaves in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 99 THE VIRGINIA MAGAZINE OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 45,
61 n. 50 (1991). These reclassifications responded to tensions between the inheritance of land
together with enslaved persons to work the land, and the sale of enslaved persons to satisfy
estate debts. See id. at 61.
110
See Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 336.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 340.
113
Id. at 335–36.
107
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future interest in them, upon the happening of the same or similar conditions.114 If a third party could have a valid executory interest in these
enslaved persons, Judge Roane reasons, so much the more valid is their
own claim to be emancipated on the same terms.115
Turning to the substance of the devise, as a condition, “. . . passing a law to authorize emancipation, standing simply, is too remote, as
it may not happen, within 1000 years . . .”116 Does this invalidate the
interest? Not if it can be read to be limited to lives in being: “. . . such
a limitation to one, in esse [in being], for life is good; because the contingency must happen, if at all, so as to vest the estate, within a life in
being . . .”117 Judge Roane is here properly distinguishing between an
executory interest that vests in a person upon the happening of a remote
condition (“To A, but if X occurs, to B”) (invalid), and an executory
interest (whether in fee or in life estate) that vests in a particular person
if an event (even a potentially remote event) occurs within the lifetime
of the grantee (“To A, but if X occurs during the life of B, to B [or: for
life]”) (valid).118 Thus, as to persons in being when the interest is created, “. . . this restrains the happening of the contingency… and makes
the executory devise good, at least as to all, who are within the legal
limits [that is, of the perpetuities period].”119 Reasoning in this way,
Judge Roane continues, “. . . the estate [the interest], limited on the contingency (if I may so express it,) that is to say, the right to freedom, was
good, if the contingency happened within the legal limits, in favour of
such, as might be in esse to enjoy it, and void, if it happened beyond
those limits.”120 In more contemporary terms, a condition precedent
(however potentially remote) to the emancipation of a particular person,
who is already alive (“in being”) when that condition is imposed, must
necessarily be fulfilled during that person’s lifetime, or never (with respect to their emancipation), and is therefore valid.121
Applying this result (“ . . . the limitation can be sustained [the
interest can be validated] . . . as to such as might be in esse during such
limits; although it may be void, as to such as might be born, in a remote
generation”122) to the facts of Pleasants, Judge Roane finds that for all
those already born when the will took effect, who were alive when the
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 335–36.
Id. at 337.
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. 319, 336 (1800).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 338.
Id.
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. 319, 338 (1800).
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law changed and who have reached 30, the emancipation provision is
effective for them once both conditions are fulfilled, even if invalid as
to others yet unborn.123
Because the law changed during the life of many enslaved persons in being at Pleasants’ death, “. . . the limitation over has thenceforth
become vested, in interest, in all the appellees [the enslaved persons],
then in esse; and vested in possession, as to all, then, or as they might
become, thirty years of age.”124 This, then, is the “easy” category, or
rather, two categories, of emancipated persons: (1) enslaved persons already 30 years old in 1782, when the law changed, and (2) those who
have attained that age by the time of this judgment (1800), all of whom
were (conveniently) born in 1770 or before, and thus, all of whom were
in esse, in being, when the original will was made (in 1771).125
As to a third category, (3) those not yet 30, Judge Roane concludes, “. . . their right to freedom was complete, but they were postponed /as to the time of enjoyment.126 They were in the case of persons
bound to service for a term of years; who have a general right to freedom, but there is an exception, out of it, by contract or otherwise.”127
There are two things worth noting about how Judge Roane handles this third group. The first is that he readily assimilates - indeed,
equates - enslaved persons (of African descent) who have a right to freedom upon attaining a particular age, with (White or mixed race) persons
“bound to service for a term of years.”128 That approach will later be
rejected outright in Maria v. Surbaugh, with devastating consequences.129 The second point is that Roane does not inquire or differentiate between those born before or after 1782 (but after 1771), or between those born to mothers already 30 in 1782, or in 1800.130 His
perpetuities analysis simply does not make those fine distinctions.131
The last category he considers are (4) “. . . the children born of
mothers, so postponed in the enjoyment of their freedom.”132 He is referring to children born after 1782 to women who were themselves born
after 1770 (not yet 30 in 1800).133 Judge Roane asks of such children,
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 338–39 (1800).
Id.
Id. at 339.
See id.
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 246 (1824).
See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 338–39 (1800).
See id.
Id. at 339.
See id.
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“Are they, at their birth, entitled to freedom? Or are they too, to be
postponed, until the age of thirty?”134 The latter approach would seem
to validate a “remote” interest in themselves, as afterborn children are
(of course) not certain to reach thirty within twenty-one years after the
death of everyone alive at Pleasants’ death.135
But having deemed their mothers legally identical to “persons
bound to service for a term of years,” Judge Roane concludes that, the
mothers being “. . . free persons, held to service, for a term of years,
such children are not the children of slaves.”136 “. . . [A]ll the children
born of the female negroes, in question, since the passage of the act of
1782, are, and were thenceforth entitled to freedom by birth,”137 that is,
“. . . by birth and not by emancipation.”138
Judge Roane thereby invalidates Pleasants’ (perhaps well-meaning) testamentary attempt to bind such children to service until the age
of thirty, deftly avoiding the perpetuities issue, the financial requirements of the act of 1782 (including provision for minors, liability for his
debts or those of his devisees,139 etc.), and emancipating the children all at one stroke.140
To reach this result, Judge Roane treated the combined effect of
Pleasants’ will and the 1782 change of law in the most liberatory way,
not simply as providing for the uncertain possible future emancipation
134

Id.
Worse yet, this possible invalidity might seem to threaten Judge Roane’s validation of the
gift for any member of the glass. However, when Pleasants was before the court in 1800, the
English case of Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817), imposing the “all
or nothing” class gift rule, had not yet been decided, and Judge Roane describes himself as
interpreting the will “construed distributively.” Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 338. For this reason,
one commentator’s statement that “A gift to an entire class requires that the R.A.P. be satisfied
for the entire class, or it fails entirely. . .” is incorrect, or rather, is an anachronism. Timothy
Sandefur, Why the Rule Against Perpetuities Mattered in Pleasants v. Pleasants, 40 Real Prop.
Prob. & Tr. J. 667, 674 (2006). Sandefur’s misunderstanding does not stop there; he also suggests the rule of convenience can be used to cure a perpetuities-violating class gift. Id. at 674. It
cannot. The rule of convenience is a class-closing rule used to distribute a gift (after the termination of the prior estate); the Rule Against Perpetuities applies when the interest is created.
An invalid class gift therefore does not “survive” long enough to be closed using the rule of
convenience. Thus, although the rule of convenience was established in time to be used in
Pleasants, it was not cited because it did not apply. See Andrew v. Partington, 2 Cox 223, 3 Bro.
C.C. 401 (1791), cited in Adrian P. Schoone, Class Gifts: Time When Class Closes - Rule of
Convenience, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 205, 206 n. 5 (1957).
136
Pleasants, 6 Va. at 339.
137
Id. at 343.
138
Id. at 345.
139
Id. at 344–45.
140
And he knows it. Id. at 339–40 (“The view of the subject I have now taken. . .will supersede
the necessity of a very delicate and important enquiry: Namely, whether the doctrine of perpetuities is applicable to cases in which human liberty is challenged?”).
135
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of one group of enslaved women, but as fundamentally changing - humanizing - their status.141 It is neither radical nor controversial that “. . .
the children of a free mother are themselves also free.”142 What is radical - and so controversial his brethren on the court did not so much reject
as simply ignore it - is the idea that the children of an enslaved woman,
not yet actually free nor ever certain to become so, are nonetheless “the
children of a free mother”143 and thus “free[] by birth.”144
Had Judge Roane’s approach been adopted by the majority, all
enslaved persons in Pleasants’ estate born before 1770 or after 1782
would be emancipated at once, and only those born in between those
dates, aged 19 to 29 when the case was decided, would serve until the
age of thirty.145 As a perpetuities matter, his reasoning is somewhat
sloppy - persons born after Pleasants’ death, whether before or after the
passage of the 1782 act, are not certain to reach the age of 30 “in time,”
and some of those born after 1782 were born to women under 30 at that
time.146 Yet his determination not to allow these niceties to threaten
emancipation is admirable. He reads the act of 1782 as “. . . authorizing
or encouraging emancipation . . .”147 and sees the practice itself as
“countenance[d]” by the “Legislature, at least from the æra of our independence,” and regards it as “dear to every friend of liberty and the human race . . .”148 For his own part, he says, “[a]s it is the policy of the
country to authorize and permit emancipation, I rejoice to be an humble
organ of the law in decreeing liberty to the numerous appellees now
before the court.”149
2. . . .but Judge Paul Carrington and President (Chief
Justice) Edmund Pendleton impose servitude and family
separation
Judge Paul Carrington (1733-1811) and Judge Edmund Pendleton (1721-1803), the first Chief Justice of Virginia, were both original

141

See Hast, supra note 32, at 236 (“The vast majority of Negroes, as slaves, lived under a
legal-social system which dehumanized them. Treated as property, they did not even have the
dignity of family names”).
142
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 339.
143
Id. at 339.
144
Id. at 345.
145
See supra Part II.E.1.
146
See supra Part II.E.1.
147
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 340.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 344.
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appointees to Virginia’s Supreme Court, named in 1788.150 Pendleton
was also a Virginia delegate to the First Continental Congress.151 Both
are much more willing than Judge Roane to impose perpetual hereditary
enslavement for the first thirty years of life.152
Judge Pendleton and Judge Carrington engage differently with
the perpetuities issue. Had Pleasants’ will instructed his executor to
emancipate the enslaved persons immediately upon his death, “the condition, being unlawful, would have been void, and the property vested
. . .”153 absolutely in the legatees to whom the enslaved persons were
bequeathed.154 A later change of law would have no effect. However,
“. . . a condition, that they should become free when the law would permit it, was not of that sort.”155 Still, any future interest created thereby
is “. . . void; since the Legislative permission might never be given:
might be afforded one hundred years after; or at any earlier period.”156
A future interest on this remote condition, whether held by the enslaved
persons themselves or anyone else, is invalid.
Judge Carrington, undeterred, says,
[T]hese devises are sustainable. . .and not liable to the
rule respecting chattel interests, limited on more remote
contingencies, than the law allows. For the subjects of
the devises are different; inasmuch as in the devise of
chattels, property only, is concerned; but liberty is devised in this case. Both sacred rights indeed; but the
rules of limitation not necessarily the same with regard
to them.157
Where Judge Carrington chooses, in effect, to dispense with the
Rule, Judge Pendleton crafts his own rule: “But I am of the opinion, that
it would be too rigid to apply that rule, with all its consequences, to the
present case . . .”158 Instead, he says, “. . . if the [change of law] happens
150
Paul Carrington (Judge), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Carrington_(judge) (last updated Mar. 28, 2020); Edmund Pendleton, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edmund_Pendleton (last updated Mar, 18, 2020).
151
Edmund Pendleton, supra note 150.
152
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 356 (Pendleton, majority opinion); id. at 348 (Carrington, concurring).
153
Id. at 351.
154
Id. at 350.
155
Id. at 351.
156
Id.
157
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 347 (Carrington, concurring).
158
Id. at 351 (Pendleton, majority opinion).
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whilst the slaves remain in the possession/of the family, without change
by the intervention of creditors or purchasers. . . the bequest [manumission] ought to take place . . .”159 Judge Pendleton seeks to protect those
who, for example, may have purchased enslaved persons from Pleasants’ legatees, only to suffer a potential forfeiture upon a change of
law.160 Thus, he believes “. . . it ought to be considered . . .” whether the
court should, “. . . in equity, prevent the devise of the manumission from
taking effect.”161 In contemporary terms, we might say that Judge Pendleton weighs the interests of downstream transferees who are BFPs for
value, against a donee future interest holder, as contemporary recording
statutes do.
Because Pleasants’ will did not simply direct what Pendleton
calls a “general” (meaning, immediate) manumission as soon as the law
permitted,162 the thirty-year age condition, “. . . directing all future generations of these people, born whilst their mothers were under thirty,
should serve to that age . . .”163 must also be taken into account. Judge
Carrington identifies “. . . the periods, at which, the appellees will be
respectively entitled to their freedom . . .”164 as follows:
“. . . all those now above the age of thirty years . . . are to be
emancipated at once” 165;
“. . . the increase of mothers above the age of thirty, at the term
of the birth of the child, are also to be emancipated immediately”166;
“. . . those born of mothers, not thirty years of age at the birth of
the child, are not to be liberated, until they arrive at the age of thirty
. . .”167;
“. . . and the same rules are to be observed, with respect to their
progeny, born, during the servitude of the mothers.”168
Judge Pendleton takes a similar approach, but also believes the
judgment must take account of that section of the act of 1782 requiring
that provision be made for enslaved persons who are emancipated after
the age of 45.169 And thus Judge Pendleton, for the Court, decrees as
follows:
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at 351–52.
See id.
Id. at 352.
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 352 (Carrington, concurring).
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 348.
Id.
Pleasants, 6 Va. at 352 (Pendleton, majority opinion).
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(1) all the slaves of which the testators were possessed as
their property at the time of their respective deaths170 not
subjected to the claims of the creditors or purchasers before stated, and who are now above the age of forty five
years and their increase born after their respective mothers had attained the age of thirty years (so soon as [the
appropriate persons] enter into bonds…) and all such as
are now above thirty and under the age of forty five years
immediately shall be emancipated and set free to all intents and purposes, in like manner as if they had been
born free;171
(2) all who are now under the age of thirty, and whose
mothers had not attained that age at their birth; and all
their future descendants, born whilst their mothers are in
such service, do serve their several owners until they
shall respectively attain the age of thirty years, and then
be in like manner free.172
The remedy crafted by Judge Pendleton (and clearly along the
lines suggested by Judge Carrington) at least favors the ultimate emancipation of the adult progeny of those enslaved by Pleasants, by sustaining rather than striking down a remote condition of their emancipation.173 It does so, however, by imposing perpetual hereditary
enslavement for the first thirty years of life,174 and the forced separation
of emancipated mothers from their still-enslaved children.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
William Holliday, born in 1738 in England, was one of the early
settlers of Augusta County, Virginia.175 He died in Winchester, Virginia, in 1790,176 survived by his widow, Jane McClanahan, and their

170

Id. at 320–21 (one of John’s sons and legatees died in 1777, testate under a will with a
manumission provision like that in his father’s will).
171
Id. at 356.
172
Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) at 356.
173
Id.
174
Cf. Harris v. Clarissa, 14 Tenn. (6 Yer.) 227, 241 (Tenn. 1834) (stating “if this construction
be the true one, we have in perpetuity slaves for a term of years”).
175
William Holliday (13), WE RELATE, https://www.werelate.org/wiki/Person:William_Holliday_(13) (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).
176
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. 228 (1824).
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six young children, ranging in age from fourteen down to three (a seventh child, born in 1788, died the same year as William, Sr.).177 By a
will made the same year as his death (after the act of 1782, but ten years
before Pleasants was decided), Holliday bequeathed178 an enslaved toddler named Mary to his second son, William McClanahan Holliday, who
was just ten years old at the time.179 The practice of giving enslaved
people to children as gifts or bequests was widespread.180 By the terms
of Holliday’s will, Mary was to be emancipated upon reaching 31 years
of age.181
Fourteen years later, in 1804, William, Jr., sold the now-17 year
old Mary to one John White, who thereafter sold her to Gilkeson.182
Gilkeson later sold Mary to Benjamin Carman, who sold her to David
Surbaugh,183 by which time Mary had had her first child, Maria.184 Mary
and Maria were sold together to Surbaugh185 (as was common though

177

See William Holliday (13), supra note 175.
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824). The court’s use of the term “bequeath”
reflects the personal property characterization of enslaved persons. “Devise” is the real property
term. The two had not yet become interchangeable as they are today. The distinction was respected at least until the late 19th century. See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY
OF LAW 129 (1891) (“bequeath”); Id.at 364 (“devise”).
179
See William Holliday (13), supra note 175.
180
STEPHANIE E. JONES-ROGERS, THEY WERE HER PROPERTY: WHITE WOMEN AS SLAVE OWNERS IN
THE AMERICAN SOUTH 27 (2019).
181
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228. This age condition may have been intended to track the
1705 Virginia law imposing bound servitude until age 31 on any mixed-race child of any White
woman, although that restriction was cut back to age eighteen in 1765 for female children. 3
HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 68, at 447–63 superseded by 8 HENING’S VIRGINIA
STATUTES, supra note 86, at 133–35.
182
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228; This “Gilkeson” might be one of the children of Archibald
Gilkeson. Archibald Gilkeson, Archibald Gilkeson, GENEALOGY, https://www.geni.com/people/Archibald-Gilkeson/6000000001944731587 (last updated Nov. 18, 2014).
183
Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228 (1824). It seems likely that Surbaugh is David
Johann (Zorbach) Surbaugh, a Hessian-born slave-owning cabinetmaker who lived in
Lewisburg, (now West) Virginia, although multiple records state that he died in 1823, before
the case was decided.
CHRISTOPHER H. JONES ANTIQUES https://www.christopherhjones.com/chest-of-drawers-with-a-pocahontas-county-west-virginia-history/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2020); David Johann (Zorbach) Surbaugh, ANCESTRY.COM, https://search.ancestry.com/cgibin/sse.dll?_phsrc=lgg2&_phstart=successSource&usePUBJs=true&indiv=1&dbid
=60525&gsfn=David&gsln=Surbaugh&qh=/PX4JJ//Qmv9/9S8UZHeSg%3D%3D&new=1&rank=1&uidh=000
&redir=false&msT=1&gss=angs-d&pcat=34&fh=1&h=11479650&recoff=&ml_rpos=2 (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020); Southern Tall Pie Safe Attributed to David Surbaugh, Cowan’s: A
HINDMAN CO, https://www.cowanauctions.com/lot/southern-tall-pie-safe-attributed-to-davidsurbaugh-3926969 (last visited Mar. 31, 2020).
184
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not universal186); between that sale and Mary’s 31st birthday (September
1, 1818), she had three more children, Nancy, Solomon, and Samuel.187
Mary turned 31 in 1818, and sometime thereafter she brought
suit against Surbaugh in forma pauperis to emancipate herself and the
children.188 Whether Mary remained enslaved to Surbaugh for several
years before suing for her freedom, or whether the suit itself took a number of years to reach the Virginia Supreme Court (or both), is unknown.
If she delayed, it may have been under the influence of a law passed by
the Virginia General Assembly in 1806, which provided, inter alia,
That if any slave hereafter emancipated shall remain within this
commonwealth more than twelve months after his or her right to freedom shall have accrued, he or she shall forfeit all such right, and may
be apprehended and sold by the overseers of the poor of any county or
corporation in which he or she shall be found, for the benefit of the poor
of such county or corporation.189
Particularly if the younger children were very young in 1818,
she may have remained with Surbaugh simply to avoid being subjected
to this law, which was as cruel a form of family separation as the auction
block. And should we be tempted to assume that Mary or her children
would have been ignorant of the niceties of Virginia slave law, the work
of contemporary historians is a useful corrective. In suits for freedom,
enslaved people frequently represented themselves, often ably and
sometimes even successfully.190
In the suit against Surbaugh in Chancery, Mary prevailed, but
the children lost, and appealed.191
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JONES-ROGERS, supra note 180, at 135–36.
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 228.
188
Id.
189
3 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, FROM OCTOBER SESSION 1792, TO DECEMBER
SESSION 1806, at 252 (Samuel Shepherd ed., Richmond, Va., 1836).
190
JONES-ROGERS, supra note 180, at 135–36; see ARIELA GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL:
A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008); see also ANDREW FEDE, ROADBLOCKS TO
FREEDOM: SLAVERY AND MANUMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES SOUTH 35–87 (2012).
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Maria, 23 Va. at 228.
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IV. MARIA V. SURBAUGH IN THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT
Three judges heard Maria v. Surbaugh.192 Chief Justice Francis
Taliaferro Brooke,193 Judge John W. Green, who wrote the majority
opinion,194 and Judge William H. Cabell.195 Judge Cabell concurred
with Judge Green, without a separate opinion.196
Chief Justice Brooke, the fourth Chief Justice of Virginia, was
born August 27, 1763, in Spotsylvania County, Virginia, and served in
the Revolutionary War while still a teenager.197 He served on the Virginia Supreme Court for the last forty years of his very long life, from
1811-1851.198 Judge Green was born November 9, 1781, in Culpeper
County.199 As a young man, he “[s]erved gallantly in the War of 1812,
and so distinguished himself at the Bar that he was soon made Chancellor, and afterwards was promoted to the Bench of the Supreme Court of
Appeals.”200 He served on the court of chancery beginning in 1819, and
on the supreme court from October 11, 1822, until his death on February
4, 1834.201 The 1830 census indicated his household consisted of him-

192

Id. at 229, 245. The opinion notes that Judge Coalter “did not sit in this cause.” Id. at 229,
n. a1. It appears that the fifth seat may have been empty as a result of the Hon. William Fleming’s death on February 15, 1824. William Fleming, November 26, 1780-February 15, 1824
(Presiding Judge, July 30, 1809-February 15, 1824), VA. APPELLATE CT. HIST., https://scvahistory.org/courtofappeals/f/william-fleming-1781-1824/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2020); Judge Dabney
Carr, Thomas Jefferson’s nephew, filled the vacancy left by the death of the Hon. William Fleming. Virginia Historical Society, The Carr Family, 3 VA. MAGAZINE OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 208,
214 (1895).
193
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, ENCYCLOPEDIA
VIRGINIA,
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Judges_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_Virginia#start_entry (last updated Feb. 3, 2020).
194
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 229; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 193.
195
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245; Judges of the Supreme Court of Virginia, supra note 193.
196
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245. Strikingly, in McMichen v. Amos, Judge Cabell wrote an
opinion for a unanimous court in which he stated (albeit in dicta) that the child of an enslaved
woman unlawfully imported into Virginia (and thus free by law) would be entitled to their freedom, derivatively from hers, even if she died without any legal declaration of her free status. 25
Va. 134 (4 Rand.) 135, 142 (1826).
197
Francis T. Brooke, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L. ARTHUR J. MORRIS L. LIBR. SPECIAL
COLLECTIONS, http://archives.law.virginia.edu/person/francis-t-brooke (last visited Apr. 1,
2020).
198
Brooke, Francis Taliaferro, 1763-1851, SOCIAL NETWORKS AND ARCHIVAL CONTEXT,
https://snaccooperative.org/view/5792233 (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
199
John Williams Green, October 11, 1822-February 4, 1834, VA. APPELLATE CT. HIST.,
https://scvahistory.org/courtofappeals/g/john-williams-green-1822-1834/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2020).
200
PHILIP SLAUGHTER, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF WILLIAM GREEN, LL.D.: JURIST AND
SCHOLAR, WITH SOME PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF HIM 13 (Richmond, Wm. Ellis Jones 1883).
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John Williams Green, October 11, 1822-February 4, 1834, supra note 199.
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self, his (second) wife, Million Cooke (a granddaughter of George Mason), and their twelve-year-old son, John;202 two other White men and
three White boys, one additional White woman and girl - and 42 enslaved people (28 male and 14 female).203
A. A future interest in oneself?
In deciding this suit for freedom by the children of a conditionally-emancipated woman, Judge Green addresses, head-on, a matter engaged less directly in Pleasants: namely, the nature of the future interest, if any, created by postponed testamentary manumission.204 Judge
Green queries whether “. . . an emancipation by will is, in effect, a bequest of the testator’s property in the slave, to the slave intended to be
emancipated . . .”205 Judge Roane, in Pleasants, had assumed as much:
in evaluating the validity of a future interest that did not vest until the
law was changed and the enslaved person reached thirty, he treated it as
if it were an “ordinary” remainder going to “ordinary remaindermen.”206
The entire Court had perhaps done the same, in validating a thirty-year
emancipation provision, even while acknowledging that “liberty” is different.207
Judge Green traces the consequences of treating emancipation
as vesting the enslaved person with a property interest in herself.208 Although others owned Mary temporarily, she herself would be her own
ultimate owner.209 And by that logic, the law would make her the ultimate owner of her children, even those born while she was (still and
temporarily) enslaved.210 As Judge Green explains, “. . . if the testator
gave the property in Mary to his son, until she attained the age of 31,
and afterwards to herself . . . the son was entitled to her issue until she
attained that age,211 and she then became entitled to them.”212
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JOHN COOKE GREEN, FINDAGRAVE.COM (2005).
Wikipedia, John W. Green, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_W._Green.
204
See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 228–29 (1824).
205
Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
206
Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 335–36 (1800) (Roane, J.).
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Id.; Id. at 347 (Carrington, J.).
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See id. at 338–40.
209
See id. at 340–41.
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See id.
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Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 230 (1824) (explaining that the testator did not
know if Mary would live to be 31 and thus fulfill the condition on her emancipation).
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Id. (emphasis in original).
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“But” - Judge Green says - “I cannot assent to this proposition.”213 He then sets about explaining how to avoid this outcome.214
B. Self-ownership and self-enslavement
Judge Green is not about to reject Lemma (1), supra, the modified rule of increase that returns the issue of an enslaved woman (or
animal) to the ultimate owner of that woman, rather than any temporary
hirer or owner of any inherently limited estate.215 Any analysis of Holliday’s devise that emancipates unborn children sub silentio is, for Judge
Green, a reductio ad absurdum of its other premise: the Lockean idea
of property in oneself.216 And so he rejects it, stating, “No man can take
or hold a property in himself.”217
Emancipation, on Judge Green’s view, is not a transfer to the
enslaved person; it is fundamentally unlike the transfer of human property from one slaveowner to another.218 Instead, “[e]mancipation is an
utter destruction of the right of property,”219 whenever it takes place. “If
it be conditional or future, the condition being performed, or the time
come, then, and not till then, the right of property is wholly gone.”220
Judge Green offers three arguments against the idea that conditional emancipation creates a future interest in human property, owned
by that very person.221 But in framing these arguments, he must negotiate the legal system that supports slavery itself, including practices of
testamentary manumission and related rules vindicating the property
rights of slaveowners.222
Judge Green’s first argument against self-ownership is the problem of self-enslavement. “If he could [take or hold a property in himself], he might sell himself, and, by his own act, become a slave.”223 Just
as those with property in others can sell them under slavery, it would
seem to follow that one who owns himself could do the same. This

213

Id. at 231.
See id. at 231–36.
215
See id. at 230– 31.
216
Karen I. Vaughn, John Locke’s Theory of Property: Problems of Interpretation, Libertarianism.org (Mar. 1, 1980).
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Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231.
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Id. at 230.
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Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
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See id. at 231–34.
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See Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231.
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seems so evidently impossible or wrong to him that no further argument
on this basis is offered.224
Interestingly, Blackstone (who Green quotes225) offered an argument against the possibility of selling oneself into slavery more than
fifty years earlier.226 But Blackstone was an abolitionist, who found it
“. . . repugnant to reason, and the principles of natural law, that such a
state [slavery] should subsist any where.”227
For Blackstone, the self-enslaving transaction is a legal and conceptual impossibility, because the nature of the transaction in the same
instant reduces the “seller” to an article of property thereby unable to
receive payment from the purported “buyer.”228 In the Commentaries,
he explains,
[I]t is said that slavery may begin “jure civili;” when one
man sells himself to another. This, if only meant of contracts to serve or work for another, is very just: but when
applied to strict slavery, in the sense of the laws of old
Rome or modern Barbary, is also impossible. Every sale
implies a price, a quid pro quo, an equivalent given to
the seller in lieu of what he transfers to the buyer: but
what equivalent can be given for life, and liberty, both of
which (in absolute slavery) are held to be in the master’s
disposal? His property also, the very price he seems to
receive, devolves ipso facto to his master, the instant he
becomes his slave. In this case therefore the buyer gives
nothing, and the seller receives nothing: of what validity
then can a sale be, which destroys the very principles
upon which all sales are founded?229
Though clever, this argument cannot really do for Blackstone
what he seeks; one might respond that the person selling him- or herself
into slavery retains their legal personhood just long enough to receive
(and perhaps transfer) that payment. Blackstone also fails to account
for anything even slightly less absolute than what he calls “strict slavery.” A defender of Virginia’s extreme chattel slavery could still point
224

See id.
See Vaiden v. Bell, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 448, 451 (1825) (citing Blackstone).
226
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 411–12 (1753),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch14.asp [hereinafter BLACKSTONE
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Id. at 411.
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to practices by which enslaved persons were permitted to earn money in
their own right, keep some share of their wages, and indeed, purchase
their way out of slavery.230 What might seem impossible to Blackstone
was nevertheless quite real in slave-holding Virginia, which tolerated
these paradoxes in the interests of preserving slavery.
Regardless of the soundness of Blackstone’s position, however,
Judge Green’s argument against self-enslavement cannot be Blackstone’s, which is both too weak (as noted above) and too strong (as it is
part of a larger argument intended to undermine both of the only two
possible legitimate bases of slavery).231
Blackstone’s argument also lacks what Judge Green’s must contain, even if sub rosa: the ineliminable racial dimension of Virginia slavery.232 Self-enslavement, for Judge Green, must be impossible, in order
that it be clearly foreclosed for White people (while bound labor is permitted).233 The enslavement of persons of African descent operates on
different, racialist premises, undreamt of by Blackstone, permitting the
enslavement of those of African descent on terms wholly different from
the contractual servitude (however oppressive) of persons of European
(and other non-African) descent.234

230
See, e.g., On Buying One’s Freedom: Sections from 18th-& 19th-Century Slave Narratives,
NAT’L HUMAN. CTR. RESOURCE TOOLBOX (1500-1865), http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/pds/maai/emancipation/text1/buyingfreedom.pdf.
231
The other possible justification for slavery addressed by Blackstone is capture in war. “As,
first, slavery is held to arise ‘jure gentium,’ from a state of captivity in war….The conqueror,
say the civilians, had a right to the life of his captive; and, having spared that, has a right to deal
with him as he pleases. But it is an untrue position, a man may kill his enemy: he has only a
right to kill him, in particular cases; in cases of absolute necessity, for self-defence; and it is
plain this absolute necessity did not subsist, since the victor did not actually kill him, but made
him prisoner. War is itself justifiable only on principles of self-preservation; and therefore it
gives no other right over prisoners, but merely to disable them from doing harm to us, by confining their persons: much less can it give a right to kill, torture, abuse, plunder, or even to
enslave, an enemy, when the war is over. Since therefore the right of making slaves by captivity,
depends on a supposed right of slaughter, the consequence drawn from it must fail likewise.”
“Lastly, we are told, that besides these two ways by which slaves ‘fiunt,’ or are acquired, they
may also be hereditary: “servi nascuntur;” the children of acquired slaves are, jure naturae, by a
negative kind of birthright, slaves also. But this being built on the two former rights must fall
together with them. If neither captivity, nor the sale of oneself, can by the law of nature and
reason, reduce the parent to slavery, much less can it reduce the offspring.” BLACKSTONE
COMMENTARIES, supra note 226, at 411–12. The notion of a “negative birthright” is one to which
we will return, infra.
232
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 411.
233
See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 237 (1824).
234
See Teresa Michals, “That Sole and Despotic Dominion”: Slaves, Wives, and Game in
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 27 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDIES 195, 196 (1993-1994).
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“No man can take or hold a property in himself.”235 Judge Green
offers no alternative to the Lockean precept he has rejected.236 Strikingly, ownership of persons in general, from which self-ownership and
ownership of others both might seem to derive, is not understood as a
necessary premise for the system of slavery, but as a threat to it.237 If
repudiating this idea has other undesirable consequences - philosophical, legal, or economic - Judge Green pays them no heed.238
C. Two paradoxes of self-ownership
In addition to the problem of self-enslavement, Judge Green offers two additional situations that he thinks contain counterarguments
or paradoxes arising from the idea of the emancipated slave as a selfowner. These are the emancipation of the mother, coupled with temporary or lifelong enslavement of her afterborn children (“future issue”);239
and temporary emancipation and a return to enslavement.240
1. Enslaved future issue of an emancipated mother
Slave law permitted the transfer of an enslaved woman to one
person, and her future issue to another.241 But could a slave owner
emancipate that same woman, and seek to retain or transfer her afterborn
issue as enslaved persons? A grantor attempted this in the 1827 case of
Fulton v. Shaw,242 where the purported restriction on the children was
held to be void as “repugnant to the grant” of freedom to the mother.243
As the Virginia Supreme Court there explained, in an opinion by
Thomas Jefferson’s nephew Judge Dabney Carr,244
The grantor meant to emancipate Mary Shaw fully and immediately, and to hold in slavery any children she might afterwards have; and
the only question is a question not of intention, but of power. Could the
grantor, after giving the mother perfect freedom, reserve to himself any
interest in her future children? When a female slave is given to one, and
235

Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 231.
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her future increase to another, such disposition is valid, because it is
permitted to a man to exercise control over the increase and issues of
his property, within certain limits. But when she is made free, her condition is wholly changed. She becomes a new creature; receives a new
existence; all property in her is utterly extinguished; her rights and condition are just the same as if she had been born free. After thus divesting
himself of all property in the mother, the grantor could not reserve to
himself a right to hold her future progeny in slavery. A free mother cannot have children who are slaves. Such a birth would be monstrous both
in the eye of reason and of law. The reservation, therefore, was repugnant to the grant; and I need not cite authorities to shew, that in such
case, the grant is good, and the reservation void.245
Judge Carr, like Judge Green, sees emancipation not as a transfer, but as meaning “. . . all property in her is utterly extinguished . . .”246
Partus sequitur ventrem operates with lexical priority - first, the
mother’s condition must be determined, and if she is free when the children are born, the inquiry is at an end.247 Any other result is, in Judge
Carr’s words, “monstrous.”248
2. The impossibility of temporary emancipation
As discussed above, renting out the labor of enslaved persons
was a common practice,249 as was the creation of a life estate or dower
interest in an enslaved person, with a remainder to another.250 But while
enslaved persons can be temporarily given or loaned to another (by a
life estate or a short-term hiring arrangement), there is no such thing as
a grant of “temporary” emancipation, followed by a return to enslavement.251 “. . . [T]he owner of a slave, having made him free at present,
cannot bind him to any future service, such an obligation being inconsistent with the grant of present freedom.”252 This is another way in
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Fulton, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) at 599.
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See, e.g., Chisholm v. Starke, 7 Va. (3 Call) 25, 25 (1801).
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See Maria v. Surbaugh, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 228, 242–43 (1824).
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Id. at 240. Though Judge Green takes care to circumscribe this to private acts, it is in fact
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HENING’S VIRGINIA STATUTES, supra note 86, at 135–3. Similarly, the removal of an enslaved
person from Virginia, to another state which conferred freedom upon him, followed by his return
to Virginia, did not result in re-enslavement. See Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172, 173,
178 (1829).
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which the emancipated person cannot be regarded as a particular sort of
slaveowner, who happens to own themselves.
What both of these scenarios demonstrate, or at least suggest, is
that emancipation is different, better understood as a fundamental
change of status, instead of a (mere) change of ownership from another
to oneself. Later Virginia attorneys took note of this analysis. As one
argued in Hunter v. Fulcher in 1827, citing Maria v. Surbaugh,
When we say a person has a vested right of freedom, we use a
phrase (for the want of one more appropriate) applicable, in its proper
sense, only to rights of property. To say that a man is free, is not to say
that he has a vested property in himself, but to describe his status or
condition. This imperfection of language sometimes leads to fallacy of
judgment: this court corrected a fallacy of the kind, in Maria v.
Surbaugh, 2 Rand. 230, 246.253
D. Children born to a woman contingently emancipated
With emancipation thus characterized as a destruction rather
than a transfer of property, and the arguments presented against the formerly enslaved as self-owners (whether of a present or future interest),
Judge Green could answer the question of who owns Mary after she
reaches age 31 this way: “No one.”254 But Mary’s emancipation is not
at issue in this appeal.255 The issue is the status of Maria and her siblings, “. . . children born, pending the condition or contingency, or before the time appointed for the emancipation to take effect . . .”256
Unlike Pleasants, no guidance is to be found in Holliday’s will.
His failure to include the familiar formula “and her issue” in the provision emancipating her negates any argument based on his intentions.257
As Judge Brooke explains in concurrence,
If the appellants, the children of Mary, are entitled to freedom,
it cannot be by force of any thing in the will, under which she has obtained her liberty. It was highly probable, that she would have children
before she attained the age of 31; yet, they are not noticed nor alluded
to by the testator. He might have strong reasons for liberating her, when
she should arrive at the age of thirty-one, which did not apply to her
children, born before that period. It may have been unjust to his family
to extend his bounty to them also. However that may be, it is enough,
253
254
255
256
257
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that by no reasonable construction of the will, they can be included in
it, or derive any benefit under it.258
As a result, the outcome is determined by Virginia slave law
alone: “[t]hey must claim their freedom on the rule, that the children
shall be bond or free, according to the condition of the mother . . .”259
1. The options
But what, exactly, does that mean? What is Mary’s “condition,”
which determines her children’s status? Judge Green identified no
fewer than six interpretations to which Virginia law might be susceptible in such a case, six different ways of understanding how her condition
determines theirs:260
1. If the right to freedom in the mother be contingent, or
depending upon a condition, the children may be considered as born slaves, (their mother then being a slave,) and
not entitled to the benefit of the contingency or condition, upon which the mother would be entitled to her
freedom; or,
2. They may be considered as born slaves, but with all
the rights of the mother to be free, upon the happening of
the contingency, or performance of the condition; or,
3. They may be considered as born slaves, but upon the
condition being performed, or the contingency happening, the mother being free, the children may be deemed
free from their birth, by relation; or,
4. If the mother is to be emancipated at a future time, the
children may be considered as born slaves, without the
benefit of the right of the mother to future liberty; or,
5. With that right; or,
6. They may be considered as born free, upon the supposition that a vested right to future freedom in the mother,
puts her in the condition of one free, but bound to service
for a limited time.261
In interpreting Virginia law, Judge Green states the holding of
Pleasants this way:
258
259
260
261

Id. at 245 (Brooke, J., concurring).
Maria, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) at 245–46.
Id. at 231–32 (Green, J.).
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That, a testator might emancipate upon a contingency,
and that the children born of mothers who were to be free
upon the happening of the contingency, and before the
contingency happened, were born slaves, and were not
entitled to the benefit of the contingency upon which the
mother was to be entitled to her freedom, so as to be free
upon the happening of the contingency; nor were to be
considered as born free by relation. For, all the Judges
agreed, that those born after the death of the testator, and
before the passing of the act, were bound to serve until
the age of 30.262
Judge Green distinguishes Maria v. Surbaugh from Pleasants on
the ground that the emancipation in Pleasants depended not only on an
age condition, but also on a change of law which was not certain to occur
- while in Maria v. Surbaugh, “the right of the mother to freedom at her
age of 31 years, was unconditional and certain.”263 But what difference
does this really make? Both a change of law, and a particular person
reaching a particular age, are genuine conditions, not certain to occur.
Interpretation 6, the only interpretation which deems the children free from birth, comes closest to the approach taken by Judge
Roane in Pleasants.264 In that case, Judge Roane described the mothers
this way:
[T]heir right to freedom was complete, but they were
postponed as to the time of enjoyment. They were in the
case of persons bound to service for a term of years; who
have a general right to freedom, but there is an exception,
out of it, by contract or otherwise.265
In Judge Green’s version, the precondition on the children’s free
birth is their mother having a “. . . vested right to future freedom . . .”266
But this is impossible. As Judge Green states, “. . . in the case at bar,
the legacy did not vest until the legatee attained her age of 31 years;. . .if
she had died before she attained that age, the legacy would have lapsed,
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Id. at 234.
Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
See Pleasants v. Pleasants, 6 Va. (2 Call) 319, 338–39 (1800).
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and the bequest have had no effect whatever . . .”267 Judge Brooke concurs: “If she had never attained that age, it would have been wholly inoperative as to her, and her children would have had no pretensions to
freedom.”268 As an attorney in 1827’s Hunter v. Fulcher reiterated, “It
seems a solecism to say, that a man actually in bondage, has a vested
right of freedom.”269 If such a vested right is a genuine condition precedent to the children’s free birth, then, Judge Green seems to imply,
Judge Roane was in error.
But Judge Green has it wrong. Vestedness of the right to freedom is not and cannot be the basis for Judge Roane’s characterization
of these enslaved mothers as women “bound to service for a term of
years,” because the latter are also not certain to reach freedom.270
Whether the children of either group are born free thus cannot depend
on the vestedness of their mother’s future right.271
Judge Brooke rules this interpretation out as well, but as a matter
of will interpretation:
As to her condition at the birth of the appellants, according to the will, she was a slave until she attained the age
of 31. It only declares her to be free when she shall arrive
at that age…. The idea, that she was free from the death
of the testator, and only held to service until she attained
the age of 31, is wholly inconsistent with the obvious intention of the testator.272
The emphatic language he uses (“wholly inconsistent,” “obvious
intention”) poorly conceals what is actually the case: that the will said
nothing on this point.273 It emancipated her upon attainment of age 31;
it did not delve into these finer points.274 No language can be found
supporting this interpretation, it is true; but neither can any be found
negating it.275 As an interpretation of Virginia law, however, Interpretation 6 is not viable for either judge.276
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Notably, judges outside Virginia read a similar disposition as
Judge Roane had in Pleasants. “Had Clarissa a vested right to freedom
on the death of Thomas Bond? As to [her and other enslaved persons],
devised for five years to Phil Bond, we think there can be no doubt they
were intended by the testator to be free persons, held to service for a
term of years . . .”277
Interpretation 3 is an interesting (but unlikely) hybrid, reminiscent of a device used frequently in the common law of future interests.278
If Interpretation 3 were adopted, Maria and her siblings would be enslaved until their mother turned 31, but at that point, the law would reach
back in time, and emancipate them from birth (“by relation,”279 what we
might call “relation back”). This resembles the treatment of potential
heirs, in utero upon the death of an ancestor but later born alive, who
are treated as having been alive all along; and if not, as if they never
existed.280 During the pregnancy, of course, which of these futures will
come to pass is unknown; but once it is resolved, this is regarded as the
state of affairs from the death of the ancestor, giving the heir all his
rights from that time forward, seamlessly. Similarly, for what should
be mostly obvious reasons (including the rights it would confer on the
formerly enslaved), Judge Green does not seriously entertain this possibility.281
On Interpretations 1 and 2, Mary’s right to freedom is “. . . contingent, or depending upon a condition, . . .”282 while on Interpretations
4 and 5, she “is to be emancipated” or has a “right” to “future liberty,”283
language suggesting a much more robust entitlement on her part. Either
way, however, Judge Green therefore must resolve whether this future
right, however understood, is properly regarded as “. . . part of the condition referred to in the law, . . .”284 which will “follow the womb” and
apply to her issue.
This is not simple. Even if the age condition of her emancipation
is understood as part of her enslaved condition, how, exactly, does it
277
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determine her children’s status? Is it inherited, and part of their condition as well (Interpretations 2285 and 5)? Or not (Interpretations 1 and
4)? Did they “follow” her into freedom in 1818 (when she turned 31)?
Or does the age condition (emancipation upon attaining age 31) attach
to each of them individually (as in Pleasants)? Or - worst of all - does
Mary’s contingent emancipation have no effect whatever on her children’s status?
For Judge Brooke, Virginia’s partus sequitur ventrem rule is
straightforward: “It imports the condition at the time of the birth, in exclusion of any future right to liberty. It does not include a remote event,
which may never happen, nor any right of which the mother is not in the
enjoyment, at the time of the birth.”286
Judge Green believes more explanation is required. His primary
argument that the condition must not apply in favor of the emancipation
of the children of an enslaved woman “. . . entitled to her freedom at a
future day, or upon a contingency, . . .”287 is that, the children of a servant, for the same reason, though born free, would be bound, as she was,
to service, until she was entitled to be discharged from service. But they
were not so bound; from which I conclude, that the civil state of the
children, with all its consequences, was determined by the civil state of
the mother, at the time of their birth, without regard to the present obligation of a free woman, to serve, or the present right of a slave to be free
thereafter.288
On first glance, it might appear that a servant currently bound to
serve (for a fixed remaining time), and an enslaved woman to be emancipated upon a future age contingency (thus also at a calculable future
time), are similarly situated, at least with respect to the legal status (the
“civil state”) of any children born to them during that period.289 So it
appeared to Judge Roane.290 But Judge Green rejects the analogy.291
Judge Green’s argument is one that might be called, with justice,
fiendishly clever. Precisely because (he argues) the children of a
(White) servant whose time of service will end, are free (as she is), the
children of an enslaved woman (of African descent) whose emancipation will occur in the future, are enslaved (as she is).292 To give the
285
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children of a defeasibly enslaved woman the benefit of her condition, he
reasons, consistency would demand that the children of an indentured
servant be burdened to bound labor.293 But they are not.294 The similarity of their situation (women of childbearing age bound to labor for a
fixed time) is not permitted by Judge Green to obscure their raciallyessentialized difference of status.295 One is free and (typically) of nonAfrican descent (despite being “bound” to servitude), one is enslaved
and of African descent (despite a contingent future emancipation that
might actually come to pass).296
This is the distinction that makes all the difference. Partus sequitur ventrem does not recognize or pass on an indenture, which is
simply a labor contract.297 A person of European descent, on this view,
can never be what a person of African descent always and necessarily is
- enslavable, even if not always enslaved.298
2. “No middle state between slavery and absolute freedom”
In thus holding “that a slave emancipated in futuro, continues in
the meantime a slave to all intents and purposes, [and so] her children,
born in the meantime, are born slaves, and so continue, notwithstanding
the right of the mother to freedom at a future time, in which they do not
participate,”299 the Virginia Supreme Court goes well beyond what
Blackstone had called “servii nascuntur,” by which “the children of acquired slaves are, jure naturae, by a negative kind of birthright, slaves
also.”300
To reach this result, Judge Green has added a further nuance to
partus sequitur ventrem, one foreign to the world of Pleasants despite
Judge Green’s attempt to ground it in the 1765 law: the “no middle
state” ontology of binary and racially-essentialized slavery.301 According to Judge Green, “. . . the policy of the law of 1765 [was]. . .to allow
no middle state between slavery and absolute freedom, except apprenticeship during infancy.”302 As described at Part II.D, supra, a law of
1705 had bound certain mixed-race children into service until age 31;
293
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the law of 1765 cut this period back to 21 for men, and 18 for women.303
But whether this should be understood as evidencing a general intent to
establish “no middle state” between slavery and freedom is much less
clear.
In the early 17th century history of Virginia, White bound labor
(indentured servitude) was as economically important as slavery, but
over time, for various reasons, the former dwindled as the latter grew.304
By the early 18th century, “. . . slavery had become ensconced at all
levels of Virginia society and was well on its way to completely replacing indentured servitude as the primary source of bound labor in the
colony.”305 Where early Virginia had met its labor needs through a variety of forms of bound immigrant labor, to which persons of both European and African descent might be subjected, by the early nineteenth
century, White bound labor had almost disappeared, the importation of
slaves was banned,306 and hereditary racialized slavery had taken over.
The bond requirements of the act of 1782 reflected long-standing concerns about slaveowners emancipating enslaved people in order to avoid
providing for their support, and about the financial burden of emancipated persons.307 But as slavery developed into a more fully racialized
hereditary status, the very presence of free Black people in Virginia
came to be seen as a threat to the order, as reflected in the 1806 law
banishing emancipated former slaves.308
Nevertheless, the idea of persons being bound to service but not
enslaved remained in Virginia law, and sufficiently familiar to both
Judge Roane and Judge Green.309 The customary and statutorily timelimited nature of indentured servitude, which endured for a fixed period
of time (depending on the age, race, and sex of the servant),310 was familiar to jurists.
Other nineteenth century legal sources, in at least some states,
also recognized the existence of a state “between slavery and absolute
303
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freedom.” In Harris v. Clarissa, decided in 1834, the Supreme Court
of Tennessee referred explicitly to the “middle state” of children born
to a woman contingently emancipated.311 Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb,
a leading Georgia lawyer, reporter of the Georgia Supreme Court and a
founder of the University of Georgia School of Law,312 stated in his 1858
work An Inquiry Into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of
America, “. . . where laws have been passed for the gradual abolition of
slavery, . . .” “. . . the condition of the slaves. . .is changed to a state of
servitude or apprenticeship.”313
One hears echoes of Judge Roane when Cobb writes, about private emancipation, “. . . wherever the deed of manumission changes the
condition of the mother from slavery to mere servitude, though the time
of the enjoyment of perfect freedom be postponed, issue born subsequent to the deed, and pending the service of the mother, are free.”314
Ultimately, however, the “no middle state” approach became the
law of Virginia.315 But it was no foregone conclusion, and the decision
in Maria v. Surbaugh played a significant role in furthering it. If the
law as Judge Green read it was perquam durum, “exceedingly hard,”
that is in part because he hardened it.316 This did not escape the notice,
or criticism, of contemporary antebellum jurists. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee, in Harris v. Clarissa, commented upon Maria v. Surbaugh
this way: “It is a most strict construction, not to say a strained one, in
prejudice of human liberty, and is in conflict with the opinions of Chancellor Wythe and Judge Roane, in the cause of Pleasants v. Pleasants.”317
V. CONCLUSION: TWO FICTIVE BINARISMS
The developments that culminated in Maria v. Surbaugh put two
false binarisms simultaneously into play: between slavery and absolute
freedom, and between persons of African descent (Black) and those of
311
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European descent (White).318 Each depended essentially upon and drew
life from the other, and each depended on particular varieties of blindness and denial.319 Thus a sharp and rigid legal distinction was used to
discipline the unruly biological and social reality of interracial sex; the
denial of an in-between legal status, after two centuries of indentured
servitude, paralleled the denial of the reality of miscegenation, even as
laws were passed to prevent “that abominable mixture and spurious issue.”320
As for “the favor shewn by the common law to liberty,”321 Judge
Green sides with “the civilians,”322 Roman commentators on slavery
law, even while claiming (in Latin) to find this outcome “exceedingly
hard, but so the law is written.”323
This “no middle state” ontology also resolved a functionally undifferentiated category, child-bearing women bound to labor for a fixed
time, into two utterly distinct and non-overlapping groups: the enslaved
(of African descent) and the free (of European descent).324 Partus sequitur ventrem applied with lexical priority then gives the result Judge
Green reaches: the children of the enslaved Black mother are enslaved,
notwithstanding her emancipation in futuro; while the children of the
White servant mother are free, notwithstanding her current bondage.325
And even should emancipation arrive for the formerly enslaved Black
mother, the 1806 law requiring emancipated persons to leave Virginia
within twelve months, on pain of re-enslavement,326 meant she must
leave her enslaved children behind to secure her own freedom, a very
real immiseration engendered by these vicious fictions.
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